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Towards Triadic Interactions in Autism and Beyond:                                                         
Transitional Objects, Joint Attention, and Social Robotics 
 
John Z. Elias, Patricia Bockelman Morrow, Jonathan Streater, Shaun Gallagher, and 
Stephen M. Fiore 
Institute for Simulation & Training, University of Central Florida 
 
The concept of transitional objects from the British Object Relations school of psychoanalysis may offer 
insight into the affective aspects of the development of dyadic and triadic interactions.  Furthermore the 
concept may be applied to the use of social robotics in autism research and therapy, with social robots in 
these settings perhaps functioning as transitional objects for autistic children.  Possible applications in 
organizational contexts are suggested as well, along with considerations of future research relating 
transitional objects to the notions of primary and secondary intersubjectivity.  
INTRODUCTION 
 
Recent use of robots for autism research and therapy has 
received increasing attention, both in the scholarly and popular 
press (Kozima et al 2009, Mone 2010).  Such work may be 
approached from multiple disciplinary perspectives, from 
cognitive psychology to robotic engineering.  Here we suggest 
that input from a relatively neglected and often maligned field, 
psychoanalysis, may illuminate the promise of social robotics 
for autistic children.  Specifically, robots in these contexts 
may be playing the role of a transitional object in facilitating 
interactions between child, caregiver and the environment.   
This concept comes from D.W. Winnicott, a pediatrician and 
psychoanalyst associated with the British object relations 
school of psychoanalysis, and unlike other psychoanalytic 
ideas is generally considered theoretically and therapeutically 
reputable (Frankland, 2010).  According to Winnicott, a 
transitional object is an inanimate possession, usually a toy or 
maybe a blanket (imagine Linus from Charlie Brown), that the 
child attaches to as it moves from direct dependence on a 
caregiver (usually the mother) towards understanding and 
navigating an independently existing world (Winnicott, 
1953).  This transition involves the movement from dyadic to 
triadic interactions, which entails the capacity for shared 
intentionality and joint attention.  While typically developing 
children can manage with a strictly inanimate object as a 
transitional object, children with autism may need an added 
degree of animacy and interactivity for the transition to triadic 
interactions to emerge.  Whether the robotic interaction helps 
autistic children move from the subjective toward the 
objective world, or from objects towards people, or both, is an 
open question to explore.   
This rise in the role of robots in autism therapy indicates 
further implications and applications for human-robotic social 
interaction.  For example, these notions may also relate to 
organizational settings, where groups or teams relying on 
robots or other technological artifacts may be viewed as 
developing entities onto themselves in need of transition and 
cohering.  While a robot could serve as an object of care, 
almost like a child or a pet, for human team members, it may 
also serve as a point of joint attention, a common object that 
helps to enable the team as an emerging entity.  In this sense, 
then, the robot might function as something of a transitional 
object for the group or team as a whole, again as a shared 
point of joint attention and focus that in turn fosters interaction 
with the world.  We conclude by considering future directions 
for research, particularly the relation of transitional objects to 
processes of primary and secondary intersubjectivity.   
 
TRANSITIONAL OBJECTS 
 
Winnicott, in his seminal introduction of the concept 
(Transitional Objects and Transitional Phenomena: A Study of 
the First Not-Me Possession, 1953), discusses a wide range of 
possible objects and behaviors in terms of transitional 
phenomena.  Although inclusive and expansive as a category, 
we will venture a condensed description of the concept itself, 
which requires a preliminary sketch of early infant 
development, as detailed by certain strains of psychoanalysis.  
Again, despite the disrepute of psychoanalytic theory 
generally, it is potentially elucidating as a kind of speculative 
phenomenology of early childhood, with its investigation of 
the initial emergence of the sense of self in relation to others.  
Freud’s original elaboration focused primarily on the Oedipus 
complex, on the dynamic between child, mother and father 
occurring roughly between the ages of 3 to 6 years; the project 
of expounding the earlier pre-Oedipal stages was taken up by 
the British school of object relations, with Winnicott 
especially expanding upon the early relationship of infant and 
mother (Rycroft, 1995).  Winnicott speculates that a seamless 
oneness permeates the experience of early infancy.  In this 
state, the needs of the infant are (more or less) immediately 
met by the mother (or primary caregiver), and so there is no 
experience of separation between need and gratification, 
desire and satisfaction; the very existence of desire guarantees 
its satisfaction, as the appearance of desire and the presence of 
its fulfillment are experienced seamlessly as one and the same.  
The world, for the infant, seems to exist solely and exclusively 
to answer desire, to meet it in immediate responsiveness.  And 
while this phase may be something of a theoretical 
idealization, approximated only perhaps by prenatal union in 
the womb (indeed this stage of seamless oneness is precarious 
from the start, for presumably a newborn would not cry at all 
if this state of symbiotic union were perfectly preserved), such 
an extrapolation does hold some explanatory power, 
positioning subsequent conceptions of need and desire in 
relation to a point of comparison, however asymptotic.  The 
phenomenon of magical thinking, for example, in which 
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people, in certain states of trauma, believe what they wish 
were the case, that the world is just so in accord with their 
desire, may be viewed in terms of regression to this pre-
Oedipal phase of infantile oneness with the world (e.g., 
Subbotsky, 1994).   
This undividedness, of course, cannot last, and the reality 
of a world existing independently of infantile desire starts to 
make itself felt.  The infant begins to recognize that it is 
possible for its needs to go unmet, which involves, crucially, 
the recognition that the primary caregiver is a separate person.  
And while the infant, in non-pathological cases, feels that it 
may continue to depend upon the primary caregiver for 
nourishment and security, there is nevertheless a growing 
sense that the world itself does not depend on its desire.  Thus 
external reality is first identified as that which refuses to 
satisfy desire: that is, reality, as reality, is primarily identified 
as painful, as an insult and injury to that infantile sense of 
omnipotence, of permeating oneness with, and magical control 
over, the world.  And so by the same token the self, in its 
original, originating sense, is elementally identified by the 
emptying of desire, by desire divested of its object.  That is, 
the sense of self is primarily identified by, indeed primarily 
appears as, the emptiness and independence of desire itself, 
torn from the world with which it once communed.  The 
process of individuation, then, the emergence of a sense of an 
independently existing self inhabiting an independently 
existing world, is intrinsically traumatic (Trilling, 2000).   
This starkly drawn sketch seeks to make clear the 
disillusionment inherent in the psychoanalytic picture of 
development.  Yet part of Winnicott’s project is to highlight 
the positive and adaptive aspects of coping during 
development, and emphasize the possibility of investment in 
the world in the face of its emotional divestment (Storr, 1989).  
Again, although the infant, if well cared for, feels secure in the 
environment provided by the primary caregiver (what 
Winnicott calls the holding environment), the move from the 
illusion of magical omnipotence to a sense of helpless 
dependence nevertheless represents a fundamental (and of 
course necessary) break, and the infant finds itself in a bare 
objective world that no longer answers to its wishes (indeed 
objectivity here is understood precisely as the refusal of 
wishful thinking).  But the infant also begins to become aware 
of its ability to move its own body, and comes to see that, 
while the outer world itself may not directly obey its 
commands, its body, however haltingly, does, and may be 
used to move towards and to handle objects out in the world.  
This marks the beginning of a sense of manipulation, and 
hence of objects being manipulable.  Another means of acting 
on this emerging object-directed attitude is through the 
gestural and vocal expression of needs and desires to 
physically competent grownups, marking the start of 
communication and the gradual process of making intelligible 
to others one’s wants and needs, in the ongoing negotiation of 
desire and expectation that constitutes socialization.  Thus the 
infant discovers, along with its own developing manipulability 
and physical coordination, that other people may be addressed 
to help to attain its objects and goals.  This mixture or package 
of interpersonal interaction and the exertion of control over 
objects may be viewed as the move from a strictly dyadic and 
dependent relationship between infant and caregiver towards 
triadic interactions involving infant, caregiver and the 
environment.   
The question arises, however, of whether the infant would 
even be drawn towards the world, rather than withdrawn from 
it, given the very existence of external objective reality as 
painful, its identification as that which repudiates desire.  It is 
here that the concept of transitional objects plays its central 
facilitating role.  At this point it is worth noting that Winnicott 
developed his ideas through attentive observation of infants 
and children.  And, for all of the aforementioned theoretical 
speculation, the phenomena of transitional objects themselves 
are quite open and available to everyday view, as the soft doll 
or toy that the child cannot do without, or the blanket or piece 
of fabric, and so on.  Yet the theory helps explain the 
phenomenon, illuminating its importance in terms of the deep 
need it serves the child.  The child’s thoroughgoing 
attachment to the transitional object is partly accounted for by 
its status as a substitute for the caregiver (in the original 
formulation, a substitute for the mother, more specifically the 
mother’s breast), as a symbol of the safety of that primary 
relation.  But the object is termed transitional for a reason, and 
not only serves as a reminder of a previous state but plays a 
transitive role as well, namely to foster an affective 
directedness towards the world and its objects.  For in order 
for the infant to feel moved towards the world, the world must 
be in some sense inviting, responsive to engagement.  Hence, 
in the wake of the traumatic fissure between self and world, 
the child imbues objects with affect and feeling, in order to 
both cope with the trauma of disillusionment and dependency 
and to form attachments with the outside world.  Winnicott 
takes care to emphasize the not-me status of the transitional 
object for the infant: the object itself is understood as real, as 
not under the fantasy of omnipotent control, yet it nevertheless 
retains an element of fantasy, as a token or memento of that 
once magical control.  So perhaps the child can feel that at 
least a small part of the world of objects is still under the spell 
of its fantastical control.  Indeed, laying claim to the 
transitional object is a manifestation of the child’s growing 
capacity for physical manipulation and control, an expression 
of its ability to subject objects to its desires.  The transitional 
object, after all, is a possession, something over which the 
child exerts exclusive rights.  At the beginning of the 
appearance of transitional phenomena, a single possession 
tends to serve as the transitional object.  However, Winnicott 
speaks of transitional phenomena eventually spreading out 
“over the whole cultural field,” informing an intermediate 
realm between “inner psychic reality and the external world” 
(91).  Transitional phenomena, then, come to form a space 
where desire and emotion are not repudiated but interfused 
into the activities themselves.  This is a space of imaginative 
engagement and play, in which a child becomes absorbed in 
fantasy, where toys and objects are magically infused, where 
adults engage in art and ritual, and where culture in general 
allows us to make a home for ourselves in the world.  In this 
intermediate area of creative fantasy, nevertheless subject to 
reality-testing, the world of objects may still be imbued with 
emotion, responsive to, and invested with, meaning and value.   
 
PROCEEDINGS of the HUMAN FACTORS and ERGONOMICS SOCIETY 55th ANNUAL MEETING - 2011 1487
 at University of Wollongong on April 8, 2014pro.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
TRANSITIONAL OBJECTS AND JOINT ATTENTION 
 
These dynamics may be viewed as affective aspects of 
what is conceptualized in cognitive terms as joint attention, 
with the development of dyadic and triadic interactions 
comprised of parallel streams of emotion and cognition, affect 
and attention.  As described in the cognitive literature, strictly 
dyadic relations describe mental interaction and exchange 
between two people, the sharing of attention from one self or 
mind to another, whereas triadic relations entail the 
introduction of a third entity, whether an object or another 
person, into the interaction.  Again, dyadic relations tend to 
characterize early infant attachment with the primary 
caregiver, while triadic relations indicate the capacity to 
conceive of a world of independently existing persons and 
objects.  The capacity for joint attention, in which attention 
concerning a third object or person is reciprocally shared 
between two people, is central to triadic interactions 
(Tomasello & Farrar, 1986).  This triangulation between 
people and objects in the world is crucial to a sense of a shared 
interpersonal world, which in turn is central to the notion of an 
independently existing objective world (Davidson, 2001).  The 
concept of transitional objects brings to the fore the affective 
aspects of these interactions, providing insight into the needs 
and motives driving their development.  For instance, in order 
for the world of objects to hold an infant’s attention, it must 
also hold the infant’s affection.  And these common objects 
are introduced to the infant under the eye of the caregiver, 
with the other person serving as gateway and guide to the 
objective world.  Thus the interpersonal is required to relate to 
the world, to inhabit it, learn about it, and engage with it 
(Tomasello et al, 2005).  To a certain extent the relation 
between joint attention and affect has been recognized: indeed 
infant smiling is used to gauge attention (Stahl & Striano, 
2005); however, the theoretical relationship, we argue, may be 
elaborated by the notion of transitional objects.   
There is the question, though, of the temporal relation of 
transitional objects to joint attention.   On the one hand, the 
criterion of physical manipulability obviously places the 
emergence of transitional objects per se, in the sense of a 
single object consistently handled and carried by the child, 
later than joint attention.  For transitional objects in their fuller 
manifestations are part and parcel with the ability to physically 
interact with objects, to exert a certain degree of control over 
them.  However Winnicott states: “I suggest that the pattern of 
transitional phenomena begins to show at about 4-6-8-12 
months.  Purposely I leave room for wide variations.” (91)  
Winnicott includes as early instances of transitional 
phenomena an infant’s handling and mouthing of immediately 
proximate objects (e.g., the corner of its blanket), and so as 
nascent indications of directedness towards objects and others.  
This timeline matches recent infant studies of joint attention 
and object-directedness, in which sensitivity to triadic 
interactions has been detected as early as 3 months (Striano & 
Stahl, 2005).  Thus the broader category of transitional 
phenomena, as delineated by Winnicott, appears to be roughly 
coextensive with the phenomena of triadic interactions as 
experimentally ascertained so far.   
 
AUTISM, TRANSITIONAL OBJECTS, AND SOCIAL 
ROBOTICS 
 
Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) is marked by deficits in 
both dyadic and, especially, triadic interactions, capacities at 
the core of social interaction (Baron-Cohen 1997, Charman 
2003).  Again, approaching these social developmental deficits 
via transitional objects may illuminate the emotional and 
affective aspects of autistic interaction with others and with 
the world.  The preponderance of tantrums and repetitive 
behaviors, for instance, indicates the intensities and deep 
frustrations of many autistic children, and any insight into 
potential coping and soothing interventions may help with the 
difficult transition into social life.  Indeed Temple Grandin’s 
“squeeze machine” (Sacks, 1995) is a famous case of self-
administered therapy that might be interpretable along the 
lines of Winnicott’s notion of the holding environment.  
Furthermore, it appears an open question as to whether people 
with autism suffer from a deficit in social responsiveness, and 
hence are more comfortable interacting with comparatively 
predictable physical objects and systems, or whether they 
suffer from an excess of social responsiveness, to the point 
where they are overwhelmed by other people and hence find 
refuge in the world of objects.  While both may lead to similar 
behavioral profiles, the difference may make a difference for 
therapeutic theory and intervention.  For instance, dysfunction 
in social filtering has been hypothesized in autism (e.g., 
Kozima et al, 2009), resulting in difficulty in selectively 
filtering meaningful social information.  This sense of finding 
the social world painful and bewildering in its complexity 
might be addressable in terms of transitional objects, with 
transitional objects functioning as possible buffers or 
mediators between the physical and social worlds.   
Robots may be seen as such intermediate entities, and 
indeed social robots have been used in autism research and 
therapy to facilitate social interactions in children with autism, 
with the Aurora Project (Robins et al, 2004) and Keepon 
(Kozima et al, 2009) as representative examples.  Keepon, a 
robot designed for “facilitating the exchange of attention and 
emotion with people” (Kozima et al. 2009), has been shown to 
successfully act as an interpersonal “pivot”, an anchor for 
shared attention and interpersonal interaction between autistic 
children and caregivers. In therapeutic play sessions, dyadic 
and triadic interactions emerged between some of the autistic 
children, Keepon and the therapist or caregiver.  The simple 
toy-like features and minimal embodied movements of 
Keepon evoke and express the basic mental capacities of 
attention and emotion.  In other words, it can demonstrate both 
external directedness toward objects in the environment 
(attention) and internal evaluative responses to those objects 
(emotion).  These basic functions, of appearing to attend to 
objects and to process them emotionally, coordinate to 
simulate and facilitate dyadic and triadic interactions, enabling 
the robot to serve as a focal point for autistic children in the 
emergence of joint attention.  Again, difficulty with basic 
dyadic interactions, and the seeming impossibility of triadic 
relations, predominantly characterize the social cognitive 
deficits of autism.  However, Kozima and his colleagues 
keenly observe that Keepon's promotion of mutual 
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interpersonal interaction between autistic children and 
caregivers indicates the presence of intact motivation on the 
part of autistic children to share and express their emotions 
and intentions.   
Further explanations of the effects of these robotically-
facilitated therapeutic situations center on the conception of 
social robots as intermediaries between the human world and 
the object world, between the social intentional world and the 
physical world of objects.  On the one hand, the therapeutic 
benefits of social robotics may be explained in terms of the 
robots functioning as simpler and more predictable social 
entities, and hence as a less complex and unpredictable entry 
into social relations.  This explanation fits with the conception 
of autism as involving an essential social cognitive deficiency 
or lack.  However, if the social difficulties of autism have to 
do rather with an excess of social responsiveness, of being 
overwhelmed by complex social stimuli, then the benefits of 
social robotics become more a matter of emotional 
management, of containment of and coping with these 
overwhelming social responses, in which case the robot’s 
status as a transitional object becomes more prominent.  It 
might be said, somewhat simplistically, that the former 
explanation has a more cognitive inflection, while the latter is 
endowed with a more emotional dimension.  But of course 
“cognition” and “emotion” intimately and inextricably 
interact, with cognitive simplicity and emotional security 
ultimately going hand in hand.  Indeed the reduction of 
cognitive complexity may be seen as intrinsic to transitional 
objects generally, as central to their ability to foster a sense of 
manageability and control (Wastell, 1999).  Thus the fact that 
these social robots simplify and distill certain salient social 
cues serves to ameliorate and facilitate the cognitive and 
affective aspects of social interactions. 
The animate nature of robots also resonates with the 
concept of transitional objects.  Again the growing child at 
once recognizes the object as not-me, as a part of the outside 
world, and yet imbues it with fantasy, treating it as a facet of 
inner psychic life.  This intermediacy accounts for the child’s 
deep affective attachment to the transitional object, for it 
allows room for one’s inner life out in the outer world; it is the 
animate made animate by the imagination.  As such, 
transitional phenomena may be seen as the entry into 
symbolism and metaphor, into the ability to recognize some 
particular thing (object, image, utterance, etc…) both as itself 
and as directed towards something else.  To treat something in 
terms of something else, to move beyond concrete literality 
into analogy and metaphor, is a capacity that people with 
autism often appear to lack, and indeed an incapacity for 
spontaneous pretend play, for play overlaid by pretense and 
fantasy, is one of the early indicators of autism (Charman et al, 
1997).  What accounts for this difficulty with multiplicity of 
representation, and with otherness more generally, is beyond 
our scope here; however, the ability of robots to enable more 
dynamic interactions with autistic children may be seen in 
terms of the literalization of the normally symbolic function of 
transitional objects.  That is, social robots, as animated objects 
responsive to children’s interaction, as objects come alive as it 
were, may be viewed as the magical made manifest, as the 
actualization of the fantastical character of transitional objects.  
While typically developing children can imaginatively 
animate inanimate objects for transitional purposes, autistic 
children may require this normally imaginative and symbolic 
animacy to be actualized in some way.  And perhaps the 
animacy and interactivity of social robots awakens and 
enables the transitional impulse, offering autistic children a 
way into the intersubjective object world by suggesting the 
possibility that that world is indeed responsive to their needs 
and fantasies, that the outer world does yield a place for their 
inner lives, thus allowing space for the expression of their 
internal states.  For again one of the key claims of Kozima et 
al is that the motivation to express mental states remains intact 
in autism: the problem resides in enabling the means of 
expression.  Transitional objects serve precisely this purpose, 
as a primary bridge between the inner and outer worlds of 
developing children, and conceiving social robots as 
transitional objects for autistic children, as objects literally 
made animate and “brought to life”, may help account for their 
facilitative power, and further experimental and theoretical 
work on the affective aspects of joint attention and triadic 
interactions.   
 
TRANSITIONAL OBJECTS IN ORGANIZATIONAL 
SETTINGS 
 
Wastell (1999) represents a rare study applying the notion 
of transitional objects to organizations.  Wastell diagnoses 
repeated information systems failure in terms of social 
defenses that inhibit and paralyze learning and engagement.  
As a remedy, he advocates conceiving the development of 
information systems in terms of a transitional space, 
consisting of a supportive psychological environment 
providing opportunities for creative engagement and play.  In 
cases, for instance, where different departments within an 
organization are caught in intractable conflict, Wastell 
describes the use of models and simulations as transitional 
objects of sorts, relieving risk and anxiety and fostering a 
sense of safety by simplifying aspects of the development 
process.  Furthermore modeling may serve as a means of 
facilitating joint attention, offering a common object and goal 
in the form of a transformable object.  And while models and 
simulations are more explicitly goal-oriented than traditional 
transitional objects, they are nonetheless transitional in the 
sense of supplying malleable and manipulable objects in the 
course of development.  Indeed the increasing use of 
simulations in medical training, where emergency scenarios 
involving mannequins are invested with a sense of urgency 
and reality (Gordon et al, 2001), speaks perhaps to their 
transitional status, both in the conferral of lifelikeness upon 
the mannequins and as an early transitional stage in medical 
education. 
Robotic transitional objects, we speculatively suggest, 
may also play a role in organizational settings, in that the 
robot may serve, if not quite as a full-fledged transitional 
object per se, then as a common object of attention, an 
attentional anchor as it were, around which a group of people 
may organize and cohere.  Such a group may also be viewed 
as a kind of developing or emerging entity, in which case the 
development role of transitional objects comes to the fore.  For 
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instance, human-robot teams may be understood as 
(macro)cognitive systems onto themselves, and hence as 
developing entities in need of facilitation and transition.  In 
these situations, an interactive robot might serve as joint-
attentional pivot that keeps the team members focused on the 
same goals, especially if the robot itself is a primary vehicle 
for achieving those goals.   
 
CONCLUSIONS AND CONSIDERATIONS 
 
We thus propose that the concept of transitional objects 
illuminates the affective aspects of the development of dyadic 
and triadic interactions.  We plan future research relating 
transitional objects to notions of primary and secondary 
intersubjectivity, which describe the development of our 
embodied interactions with others within shared pragmatic 
contexts and situations (Trevarthen 1979, Gallagher & Hutto 
2008).  Additionally the concept may be applied to the 
emerging use of social robots in autism research and therapy, 
with the robots themselves functioning potentially as 
transitional objects in the facilitation of joint attention and 
triadic interactions.  Furthermore social robotics generally 
may be informed by theories that emphasize the affective and 
interactive qualities of objects; indeed, this proposal may be 
seen as among those advocating for the inherently emotional 
and affective aspects of social robotic design and human-
robotic interaction (Breazeal 2003, Picard et al 2004).  Again, 
it is precisely because autism provides a window into certain 
social deficiencies that it is a catalyst for exploration of the 
role of robotics in human interaction.  And while we make no 
causal claims connecting transitional objects, or the failure 
thereof, to the etiology of autism, the concept may 
nevertheless provide insight into aspects of its manifestation 
and treatment.  Indeed, insofar as human development 
demonstrates the sensitivity to initial conditions that 
characterizes complex systems, cautious attention to early 
pivotal interactions may well prove revealing. 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 
Composition of this paper was partially supported by the 
Army Research Laboratory and was accomplished under 
Cooperative Agreement Number W911NF-10-2-0016. The 
views and conclusions contained in this document are those of 
the authors and should not be interpreted as representing the 
official policies, either expressed or implied, of the Army 
Research Laboratory, the U.S. Government or the University 
of Central Florida. The U.S. Government is authorized to 
reproduce and distribute reprints for Government purposes 
notwithstanding any copyright notation herein. 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Baron-Cohen, S. (1997). Mindblindness: An essay on autism and theory of 
mind. MIT Press.  
Bigelow, A. E., MacLean, K. and Proctor, J. (2004). The role of joint attention 
in the development of infants’ play with objects. Developmental Science, 
7, 518–526.  
Breazeal, C. (2003). Emotion and sociable humanoid robots. International 
Journal of Human Computer Studies, 59, 119–155.  
Charman, T. (2003). Why is joint attention a pivotal skill in autism? 
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, 358, 315-324. 
Charman, T., Swettenham, J., Baron-Cohen, S. Cox, A., Baird, G., & Drew, 
A. (1997). Infants with autism: An investigation of empathy, pretend 
play, joint attention, and imitation. Developmental Psychology, 5(33), 
781-789. 
Davidson, D. (2001). Subjective, intersubjective, objective. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.  
Frankland, A. (2010). The Little Psychotherapy Book: Object Relations in 
Practice. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Gallagher, S. & Hutto, D. (2008). Understanding others through primary 
interaction and narrative practice. In J. Zlatev, T. Racine, C. Sinha, & E. 
Itkonen (Eds.), The Shared Mind: Perspectives on Intersubjectivity. 
Amsterdam: John Benjamins.  
Gordon, J.A., Wilkerson, W.M., Shaffer, D.W., & Armstrong, E.G. (2001). 
“Practicing” medicine without risk: students’ and educators’ responses 
to high-fidelity patient simulation. Academic Medicine, 76(5): 469-472. 
Kozima, H., (2002). Infanoid: a babybot that explores the social environment.  
In K. Dautenhahn et al. (Eds), Socially Intelligent Agents: Creating 
Relationships with computers and robots (65-81). Dordrecht: Kluwer 
Academic. 
Kozima, H., Michalowski, M.P., & Nakagawa, C. (2009). Keepon: A Playful 
Robot for Research, Therapy, and Entertainment. International Journal 
of Social Robotics, 1, 3-18. 
Mone, G. (2010). The new face of autism therapy. 
http://www.popsci.com/science/article/2010-05/humanoid-robots-are-
new-therapists 
Picard, R.W., Bender, W., Blumberg, B., Breazeal, C., Cavallo, D., Machover, 
T., Papert, S., Resnick, M., Roy, D., Y Strohecker, C. (2004). Affective 
learning—A manifesto. BT Technology Journal. 4(22), 1-17. 
Robins, B., Dickerson, P., Stribling, P., & Dautenhahn, K. (2004). Robot-
mediated joint attention in children with autism: A case study in robot-
human interaction. Interaction Studies, 5(2), 161-198.  
Rochat, P. (in press). Possession and morality in early development. New 
Directions in Child and Adolescent Development. 
Rycroft, C. (1995). A Critical Dictionary of Psychoanalysis, Second Edition. 
London: Puffin. 
Sacks, O. (1995). An anthropologist on Mars: Seven paradoxical tales. New 
York: Knopf.   
Stahl, D. & Striano, T. (2005). Joint attention in the first year: The 
coordination of gaze and affect between 7 and 10 months of age. In 
Berthouze, L., Kaplan, F., Kozima, H., Yano, H., Konczak, J., Metta, G., 
Nadel, J., Sandini, G., Stojanov, G. and Balkenius, C. (Eds.) 
Proceedings of the Fifth International Workshop on Epigenetic 
Robotics: Modeling Cognitive Development in Robotic Systems. Lund 
University Cognitive Studies. 123. 
Storr, A. (1989). Freud.  Oxford University Press.   
Striano, T., & Stahl, D. (2005).  Sensitivity to triadic attention in early 
infancy.  Developmental Science. 4(8), 333-343. 
Striano, T., Stahl, D.,  Cleveland, A., & Hoehl, S. (2006).  Sensitivity to 
triadic attention between 6 weeks and 3 months of age. Infant Behavior 
and Development, 529-534. 
Subbotsky, E. V. (1994). Early rationality and magical thinking in 
preschoolers: Space and time. British Journal of Developmental 
Psychology, 12, 97-108. 
Tomasello, M.,  Farrar, M.J. (1986). Joint Attention and Early Language. 
Child Development, 57, 1454-1463. 
Tomasello, M., Carpenter, M., Call, J., Behne, T., & Moll, H. (2005). 
Understanding and sharing intentions: The origins of cultural cognition. 
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 28, 675 - 691. 
Trevarthen, C. (1979). Communication and cooperation in early infancy: a 
description of primary intersubjectivity. In M. Bullowa (Ed.), Before 
Speech. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Trilling, L. (2000). The moral obligation to be intelligent: Selected essays. 
New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.  
Wastell, D.G. (1999). Learning dysfunctions in information systems 
development: Overcoming the social defense with transitional objects. 
MIS Quarterly, 23(4), 581-600.   
Winnicott, D.W. (1953). Transitional objects and transitional phenomena: A 
study of the first not-me possession. The International Journal of 
Psychoanalysis, 34, 89-97.   
 
PROCEEDINGS of the HUMAN FACTORS and ERGONOMICS SOCIETY 55th ANNUAL MEETING - 2011 1490
 at University of Wollongong on April 8, 2014pro.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
